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Executive Summary 
 
 This paper provides a critical overview of the literature on media and conflict 
by focusing on the ways in which contemporary media frame different types of 
political conflict. It reveals a fractured field. There is an extensive literature on how 
media report on wars, on election campaigns and popular protest and social 
movements in western democracies, as well as some research on media coverage of 
violent conflicts in non-democratic regimes and democratising states, but there are 
only limited attempts to draw parallels between the media coverage of different kinds 
of conflicts and little cross-fertilisation of findings from the disparate literatures. 
 
 Much of the literature discusses the ways in which western media frame 
foreign conflicts and domestic election campaigns and policy debates, while 
there is considerably less focus on the media framing of domestic conflicts in 
non-western settings, such as those that arise during and after transitions from 
non-democratic rule.  
 
 Several authors claim that reliance on existing models of media and conflict in 
established western democracies may be misleading in the study of non-
western, transitional settings. They therefore call for developing new theories 
that are more suitable to discern the role that media play in democratisation.  
 
 In contrast, this paper identifies arguments and hypotheses from the existing 
literature for further exploration in the study of media framing of political 
conflicts ± such as those on citizenship, elections, transitional justice and 
distribution of power ± in transitions from authoritarian rule and in new 
democracies, which are at the centre of the MeCoDEM project. 
 
 Media coverage of political conflict can only be understood in context. Several 
dimensions of the political context matter in this respect, such as regime type, 
international (foreign) or domestic perspectives, the degree of elite consensus, 
the degree of policy uncertainty, whether or not a conflict takes place within an 
institutionalised setting, and the stage of democratisation. Also, the literature 
suggests that media framing influences political outcomes, for example the 
decisions made by policy makers, the strategic choices of collective actors or 
popular responses to conflicts. 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The media are by far the most important source of information about politics 
and conflicts for most people, which grants them a considerable influence over 
FLWL]HQV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRSLQLRQVDQGEHKDYLRXU%\UHSRUWLQJRQVRPHFRQIOLFWVEXWQRW
on others, and by representing conflicts they report on in particular ways, the media 
strongly influence the dynamics and outcomes of conflicts, and thus also shape the 
prospects of success of conflict parties. That is why participants in conflicts ± 
including state officials, armed rebels and other warring sides, political parties, social 
movements, workers on strike and pro-democracy activists in authoritarian states ± 
aim to exploit the media to foster their goals by adapting their activities to the logic of 
media operation. This paper provides a critical overview of the literature on media 
and conflict by focusing on the ways in which contemporary media frame inter-state 
and civil wars, extreme violence, institutionalised conflicts and social movements in 
western democracies, and conflicts in non-democratic regimes and in 
democratisation. The paper aims to draw parallels between media reporting on these 
political conflicts and to suggest arguments and hypotheses for the empirical study of 
media framing of democratisation conflicts ± such as those over citizenship, 
elections, transitional justice and distribution of power ± in transitions from 
authoritarian rule and in new democracies, which are at the centre of the MeCoDEM 
project (for details see Kraetzschmar and Voltmer, 2015). 
This paper focuses on the news media. While the influence of the media that 
specialise in entertainment should not be underestimated, it is principally journalistic 
or news media that is considered to have the most powerful impact on how people 
perceive politics and conflict. The paper consists of five sections. The next section 
discusses conceptual issues, including the concepts of political conflict and 
contentious politics, the concept of framing and its uses, and provides brief remarks 
about the state of literature on media and conflict. The following three sections 
discuss main perspectives in the literature on the media framing of (1) violent 
conflicts, such as inter-state and civil wars; (2) non-violent conflicts in western 
democracies, including institutional conflicts ± such as election campaigns and policy 
debates ± and popular protest and social movements; and (3) political conflicts in 
non-democratic regimes and in democratisation. The last section draws all threads 
together by providing a brief assessment of the field and by discussing how some 
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arguments from the literature may be further explored in the study of democratisation 
conflicts, LQOLQHZLWK0H&R'(0¶VUHVHDUFKSURJUDPPH 
 
2. Conceptual issues 
Politics involves both routine events and conflict. Policy implementation, law 
enforcement, administration, payment and collection of taxes, military service, 
lobbying, clientelism and related political phenomena largely (but not exclusively) fall 
into routine politics with little conflict. By contrast, contentious politics involves 
µHSLVRGLF SXEOLF FROOHFWLYH LQWHUDFWLRQ DPRQJ PDNHUV RI FODLPV DQG WKHLU REMHFWV¶
when a government is involved in one way or another (even indirectly) and interests 
of those involved are affected. It consists of both conventional and unconventional 
politics, that is, institutionalised politics and that which unfolds largely outside (or 
spills over from) institutions (McAdam et al., 2001, p.5-8). The concept of political 
conflict largely corresponds to that of contentious politics. Some scholars avoid the 
former as detached from actors, causes and dynamics of political action. However, it 
remains widely accepted in the social science literature, while the concept of 
contentious politics is used principally but not exclusively by scholars working in the 
social movement research tradition. 
The literature on media and conflict specialises almost exclusively in one or 
another form of political conflict. Firstly, there is a long-standing interest of media 
scholars in international conflicts, principally inter-state wars.1 Other conflicts with 
large-scale violence that have received ample media coverage (and have also been 
studied from the media perspective) include civil wars and humanitarian crises, 
especially in those cases which involved international intervention.2 Secondly, there 
is a broad literature on the media and non-violent conflicts, principally in Western 
democracies, both within and outside political institutions: election campaigns and 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Bennett, et al. (2007), Entman (2004), Robinson (2002), Hallin (1986), Carruthers 
(2011), Seib (2005), Robinson, et al. (2010), Tumber and Palmer (2004), Zaller and Chui (1996) and 
Aday, et al. (2005). 
2
 Examples include Carruthers (2004), Pottier (2002), Myers, et al. (1996) and Ruigrok, et al. (2005). 
There is a considerable overlap between the literatures on the media and inter-state wars with that on 
FLYLOZDUVDQGKXPDQLWDULDQFULVHV7KH¶&11HIIHFW¶IRUH[DPSOHLVKLJKO\UHOHYDQWWRERWK)RUWKH
media and extreme violence see, for example, Strauss (2007), Kellow and Steeves (1998), Melvern 
(2004) and Pottier (2002). 
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other institutional conflicts,3 and those in which social movements and other civil 
society groups are involved.4 More recently, scholars have started studying the role 
the media play in conflicts involving popular challenges to authoritarian regimes and 
in democratisation.5 There is also an emerging literature on the impact of the media 
on violent conflict and conflict regulation.6 
Such a specialised treatment of the media coverage of political conflicts is 
hardly a surprise. It reflects a research focus of the scholarly literature on political 
conflict in general ± not only that which explores a media angle. Popular protest and 
social movements, revolutions, industrial conflict, interest group politics, 
democratisation, nationalism, civil war and inter-state war had until recently been 
studied narrowly without much interest in related forms of conflict. There have been 
more recent attempts to integrate findings from these disparate literatures within a 
EURDGHUµFRQWHQWLRXVSROLWLFV¶LHSROLWLFDOFRQIOLFWSHUVSHFWLYHDQGWREULGJHDWOHDVW 
some of these divisions (see McAdam et al., 2001; 2009). A similar attempt at 
integration of disparate scholarly findings from the media perspective focused on 
various forms of violent conflicts (wars, revolutions, riots, rebellions and terrorism) 
and on popular protest (Wolfsfeld, 1997) $QRWKHU DWWHPSW WR ORRN DW µPHGLDWL]HG
FRQIOLFW¶ (Cottle, 2006), is highly descriptive and is thus not discussed here.) This 
SDSHU¶VVFRSHLVVRPHZKDWEURDGHUVLQFHLWGLVFXVVHVDEURDGHUUDQJHRIQRQ-violent 
conflicts, such as democratisation and highly institutionalised conflicts in western 
democracies, and it is not limited to highly asymmetrical conflicts ± i.e., those in 
which governments are considerably more powerful than other actors. It is also 
considerably less ambitious: it does not aim to provide a common framework for the 
study of the media and conflict but to offer a concise overview of the literatures on the 
                                                          
3
 See, for example, Berelson, et al. (1954), Patterson (1980), '¶$OHVVLRDQG$OOHQ, Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993) and Howarth (2010). 
4
 See, for instance, Koopmans (2004), Cottle (2008), Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993), Gitlin (1980), 
McCarthy, et al. (1996), McCarthy, et al. (1998), Smith, et al. (2001) and Walgrave and Manssens 
(2000). 
5
 See, for example, (Voltmer 2013), Lynch (2012), Jebril, et al. (2013), Kern (2011), (Voltmer 2006), 
Bunce and Wolchik (2011) and Gordy (1999). The literature on the normative aspects of the 
relationship between the media and democracy and on media regulation in new democracies is 
extensive but is not discussed here. 
6
 See Wolfsfeld (2004), Gilboa (2009), Hamelink (2011) and Schoemaker and Stremlau (2014). 
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media reporting of various forms of political conflict and to draw limited parallels in an 
inductive way. 
The main reason for the less ambitious approach is that the political context 
within which media framing occurs varies considerably along several dimensions, 
which renders a comprehensive, theoretically-framed analysis of disparate fields less 
productive. Firstly, the news media frame political conflicts differently in democratic 
and non-democratic settings, which is discussed in greater detail below. Secondly, 
normal rules do not apply in times of war and this boundary becomes blurred. 
Political actorVIURPWKHµRWKHUVLGH¶UDUHO\JHWDFFHVVWRµRXU¶PHGLDZKLOHGRPHVWLF
RSSRVLWLRQWRZDULVRIWHQPDUJLQDOLVHGIRUµSDWULRWLF¶UHDVRQV7KHPDLQLVVXHLQWKHVH
FLUFXPVWDQFHV LV QRW D GLVFXVVLRQ RYHU µIUHHGRP RI WKH SUHVV¶ EXW ZKHWKHU
governments have the capacity to restrict information, which in turn depends on the 
situational circumstances (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.28). Thirdly, the media behaviour 
seems to vary depending in part on whether foreign or domestic political issues are at 
stake and partly on whether they cover institutional conflicts or those largely outside 
political institutions. Therefore, this paper takes a different approach and builds upon 
existing research on media reporting on various forms of conflict by suggesting 
relevant arguments and hypotheses for further exploration in the context of 
democratisation conflicts, such as conflicts over citizenship, transitional justice, 
distribution of power, and elections in democratising states, which fall within 
0H&R'(0¶VUHVHDUFKSURJUDPPH 
Some scholars of media and democratisation take a different view and aim to 
GHYHORS µWKHRULHV DQG HIIHFWV WKDW GLIIHUHQWLDWH WKH UROH RI PDVV PHGLD GXULQJ
GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ IURP PDVV PHGLD LQ HVWDEOLVKHG GHPRFUDFLHV¶ -HEULO HW DO, 2013, 
p.33). There is not enough evidence to support normative conceptions of the link 
between media and democracy, especially when it comes to democratising countries, 
and reliance on western models may be misleading when it comes to non-western 
settings. As a result, scholars should aim at inductive study and theory-building as 
opposed to theory-testing (Jebril et al, 2013, p. 33-34). And yet, such attempts may 
be overly ambitious because political contexts after authoritarian breakdown vary 
FRQVLGHUDEO\ 7KH FDWHJRU\ RI µQRQ-ZHVWHUQ¶ setting is defined negatively and 
conceals a huge variation in historical and cultural legacies and in regime 
types/situations. True, those arguments derived from the study of media and 
democracy in western countries that are underpinned by strong normative 
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assumptions are hardly useful in democratisation studies. Still, there is no reason 
why theories about specific aspects of media and democracy (such as how media 
frame non-violent conflicts), carefully developed and rigorously tested in empirical 
(case study- and variable-oriented) research in western democracies, should not 
serve as a solid starting point for democratisation studies. A clearly focused and 
disciplined comparative research thrives on such variation in the political contexts, 
dynamics and outcomes. 
The other concept highly relevant for this paper is that of framing. It provides 
DQ DOWHUQDWLYH WR WKH SUHYLRXVO\ KLJKO\ SRSXODU µREMHFWLYLW\ DQG ELDV¶ SDUDGLJP E\
aiming to uncover hidden assumptions behind media coverage. It takes into account 
the capacity of a media presentation to define a situation and the issues, and to set 
the terms of a debate, and reflects the richness of media discourse. Still, the term is 
sometimes used loosely, mostly as a metaphor (see Tankard, 2001, p.96-97). Some 
authors define frames broadly as cognitive structures that guide the perception and 
representation of events (Goffman, 1974). Other authors focus more on the active 
selection of frames and their outcomes. According to an influential view, framing 
involves selecting certain features of a perceived reality and making them more 
VDOLHQW LQDWH[W µLQVXFKDZD\DVWRSURPRWHDSDUWLFXODUSUREOHPGHILQLWLRQFDXVDO
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ PRUDO HYDOXDWLRQ DQGRU WUHDWPHQW UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ¶ (Entman, 1993, 
p.52). Framing influences both which events appear in the news and how they are 
reported. The more general level of framing overlaps with the concept of agenda 
setting, which puts emphasis on the media influence on the public in terms of what to 
think about. By selecting and reporting news, the media focus public attention on 
some issues, people and problems, and not others (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The 
more refined level of framing refers to how the media discuss those issues, problems 
and people (Ruigrok et al., 2005, p.158-9). By highlighting some parts of information 
about a problem, frames elevate them in salience, often through placement or 
repetition, or association with culturally familiar symbols. Simultaneously, frames omit 
other aspects of the problem (Entman, 1993, p.53-54). 
Framing occurs at several levels, including culture, the minds of elites and 
professional political communicators, the texts of communications, and the minds of 
individual citizens. This paper principally focuses on news media framing, but the 
levels are closely connected. Individuals react to framing in communication texts 
largely on the basis of existing common schemas in their minds, which originate from 
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D VRFLHW\¶V FXOWXUH (OLWHV FRPPXQLFDWRUV DQG RWKHUV ZKR HQJDJH LQ IUDPLQJ DUH
constrained in choosing from the cultural stock which records past framing. Framing 
is strategic when communicators, such as politicians, commentators and editorial 
writers, aim to exercise political influence by proposing interpretations that advance 
their interHVWVRUJRDOV/LNHZLVHVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVµIUDPHRUDVVLJQPHDQLQJWRDQG
interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize 
potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize 
DQWDJRQLVWV¶ (Snow and Benford, 1988, p.198). Others, including reporters and the 
mainstream news media editors, for the most part engage in framing without trying to 
advance any specific political or policy agenda (Entman, 1993; Entman et al., 2009, 
p.176). 
 
 
3. The media framing of inter-state and civil wars 
Scholarly literature on the media coverage of conflicts focuses principally on 
wars between states, and to a lesser extent on civil wars and extreme violence. While 
this perspective is not central to the MeCoDEM project research agenda, it includes 
the largest section of the literature on media and conflict and provides several 
hypotheses that hold a potential of shedding light on various aspects of the media 
representations of democratisation conflicts. It is hardly surprising that wars rank 
highly when it comes to the news media. Wars between and within states are 
episodic, sensational and emotionally charged events that involve conflict and 
provide dramatic images and are thus aligned to the logic of news media operation. 
They are also highly culturally resonant and trigger emotions of patriotism and 
QDWLRQDOLVP HVSHFLDOO\ ZKHQ µRXU¶ VLGH LV LQYROYHG LQ FRQIOLFW $V D UHVXOW ZDU
coverage tends to boost audience numbers and thus, through increased interest of 
advertisers, also increase profits for news organisations. 
&RQVWUDLQWV RQ WKH PHGLD UHSRUWLQJ RI ZDUV LQ ZKLFK WKHLU FRXQWU\¶V DUPHG
forces are involved normally go beyond those in the coverage of domestic politics. In 
democracies, governments have to justify involvement in wars and get popular 
support (or at least avoid the rise of strong opposition to such involvement), and thus 
put a lot of effort into shaping public opinion through the news media. They may 
choose from a broad repertoire of instruments, such as FHQVRUVKLSSUHVVµSRROV¶DQG
WKH µHPEHGGLQJ¶RI UHSRUWHUVZLWKLQPLOLWDU\XQLWVDQGVXERUGLQDWLQJ WKHP WRYDULRXV
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restrictions, carefully prepared military briefings, dissemination of information of 
questionable credibility and secretive operations targeting journalists and their news 
organisations with the aim to win the propaganda war. Attempts to get and report 
LQIRUPDWLRQIURPWKHµRWKHU¶VLGHRIWHQOHDGWRDFFXVDWLRQVRIWUHDVRQ (Kellner, 2004; 
Tumber and Palmer, 2004, p.2-3,5; Cottle, 2006, p.75-76). 
There are also self-imposed constraints that prevent journalists from reporting 
what they know about conflict. The mainstream news media coverage of international 
conflict largely reflects the dynamics of power relationships in government and 
among political elites in general. If there is consensus on important policy issues in 
the official circles, it is largely reflected in media coverage even if evidence from 
credible unofficial sources about policy failure or important but unreported events is 
available. If however some government factions and institutional interests, or political 
parties, openly oppose government policy in a particular area, media coverage 
becomes less constrained and is likely to reflect various perspectives on the issue, 
though largely in proportion with the perceived power of political players and their 
ability to spin the media. This is what largely shapes the content of the news, its 
prominence and duration as well as who is granted a voice. What matters is less 
whether particular viewpoints in the news are backed up with credible information, 
and more who pushes them forward and whether they are opposed by influential 
political actors (Bennett, 1990, p.106; Zaller and Chui, 1996; Bennett et al., 2007, 
p.48-50) µ5HFRUGLQJ¶ UDther than critically examining government policy is not the 
VLJQRISDUWLVDQVKLS LWDULVHV IURPWKH MRXUQDOLVWV¶ UHOLDQFHRQSURIHVVLRQDOQRUPVRI
objectivity and is conditioned by the lack of resources of outsiders to sustain stories 
(Entman, 1989, 37-38; Bennett et al., 2007, p.28-30) $QG \HW VXFK µLQGH[LQJ¶ RI
power relationships raises important issues of political accountability and 
manipulation, and brings into question the normative view of independence and 
power of the media in western democracies (Bennett et al., 2007, p.48-50). 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the arrival of new communication 
technology, and opportunities it provided for news gathering and live reporting on the 
battlefield, appeared to empower journalists to avoid at least some constraints on 
reporting and to strongly increase the impact of the news media on foreign policy 
formulation and implementation. Whilst this claim to strong media power became 
NQRZQDVWKHµ&11(IIHFW¶LWDFWXDOO\LQYROYHGWKHLQIOXHQFHRIERWKSULQWPHdia ± with 
their broader span and depth of coverage and influence on elites ± and broadcasting, 
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with its real-time 24/7 coverage and visual impact on both audiences and elites. 
Examples frequently cited are international interventions over the Kurdish crisis in 
northern Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1992 and Kosovo in 1999 (Shaw, 1996, p.79; 
Wheeler, 2000, p.300). And yet, the media focused on Somalia only after sustained 
encouragement by U.S. government officials and aid workers, at the time when up to 
half a million people had already succumbed to hunger and after the government had 
already decided to intervene militarily (Livingston and Eachus, 1995, p.417-425). 
Moreover, new technologies fail to reduce compliance of the news media with the 
official line. A study of the U.S. mainstream media coverage, which focused on 
extreme abuses of war prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison under the control of the U.S. 
military, demonstrated that ± despite ample available evidence from credible (but 
unofficial) sources of deliberate torture ± the media largely followed the framing of the 
VWRU\ E\ WKH RIILFLDO VRXUFHV DV µPLVWUHDWPHQW¶ DQG µDEXVH¶ E\ ORZ-level military 
personnel (Bennett et al., 2006; Bennett et al., 2007, p.49-60; but see Rowling et al., 
2011). 
Only exceptional circumstances ± such as extraordinary events, major policy 
failures or scandals ± and rapidly changing power relationships may release these 
self-imposed constraints on the media so that they can introduce underreported 
interpretations of events. One version of this argument is that there is a hierarchy of 
official and semi-official political players who push news frames down to news 
organisations and the public. Occasionally counter-frames that originate from 
secondary social or political sources may go up: when there is conflict in the official 
circles or when mid-level sources help push counter-frames up, or when the events 
that are framed are culturally ambiguous (Entman, 2003, p. 420-423). Another 
version of the argument suggests that policy uncertainty also matters. When there is 
no policy on a particular issue, or there is no policy consensus within government and 
among political elites in general, the media tend to cover the issue from various 
angles and reflect the debate. If however political elites share views on policy with 
regard to an issue, the news media tend to comply with the official line. Even in the 
unlikely case of critical media coverage, the official policy is unlikely to be changed 
and the government will employ instruments under its control, and its credibility as 
WKHPHGLD¶VSULPDU\VRXUFHWRVKDSHPHGLDFRYHUDJH(Robinson, 2002, p.30-32). In 
VKRUWWKHRXWFRPHRIWKHSURFHVVLVWKHµVHPL-
10 
 
official sources is interrupted occasioQDOO\ E\ µPRPHQWV RI UHODWLYH LQGHSHQGHQFH¶
(Bennett et al., 2007, p.106). 
:KDW IROORZV IURP WKH FRQVWUDLQWV RQ PHGLD UHSRUWLQJ LV µVNHZHG¶ PHGLD
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIZDU2QHRI WKHIHDWXUHVRIVXFK µZDU MRXUQDOLVP¶ LV WKHIRFXVRQ
PLOLWDU\VWUDWHJ\SURIHVVLRQDOLVPDQGWHFKQRORJ\PLOLWDU\YLFWRULHVDQGWKHHQHP\¶V
losses. The causes of conflict and rationale for war are given much less attention and 
space in media coverage. For example, the U.S. military actions in the early stages of 
the Vietnam War were regularly represented on television as setting the pace of war 
(58%) and tKHDVVHVVPHQWVRI WKHLU RYHUDOO µZDUHIIRUW¶ DV IDYRXUDEOH ZKLFK
hardly reflected facts on the ground (Hallin, 1986, p.146). More recently, American 
and British media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War provided a considerably more 
VSDFHIRUµEDWWOHVWRULHV¶DQGVWRULHVDERXWZDUVWUDWHJ\DQGWDFWLFVWKDQIRUDQ\RWKHU
theme (Aday et al., 2005, p.11; Goddard et al., 2008, p.16-17). 
The news media tend not to report on human and other consequences of war, 
such as (civilian and military) casualties and material destruction that inevitably 
IROORZ &RYHUDJH RI WKH  ,UDT :DU LQ $PHULFDQ PHGLD SURYLGHG D µFOHDQ¶
interpretation of war with only infrequent displays of casualties (Hallin, 1994, p.55). 
Advances in technology in recent decades, such as satellite videophones, have 
provided reporters with considerably better access to the battlefield and thus also the 
opportunity to provide their audiences a more comprehensive picture of the war, 
including that of its human and other consequences. And still, wars have more 
UHFHQWO\EHHQIUDPHGE\WKHPHGLDLQHYHQPRUHVLPSOLVWLFDQGµVDQLWL]HG¶WHUPVWKDQ
usual, ignoring a great loss of life and extensive material damage. A study of the 
 ,UDT ZDU IRXQG WKDW WKH 86 HOHFWURQLF PHGLD SUHVHQWHG µDFWLRQ-SDFNHG¶ EXW
µODUJHO\EORRGOHVV¶YLHZRIWKHZDUWRWKHLUDXGLHQFHV&DVXDOWLHVZHUHUDUHO\VKRZQ
civilians mostly recovering in hospitals, while rare showings of the dead always 
involved pictures from afar, covered or through a surrogate, such as coffin (Aday, 
2005, p.149-150). 
7KHPHGLD¶VIUDPLQJRIZDUQRUPDOO\FRPHVIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIits country 
of origin. The media and the general public tend to adopt a patriotic/nationalist 
VWDQFH VXSSRUWLQJ WKH FRXQWU\¶V DUPHG IRUFHV DQG WKHLU RSHUDWLRQV DQG UHGXFLQJ
space for legitimate criticism of the official policy. Media coverage often goes back to 
history, referring to earlier wars and their role in shaping national identity. The U.S. 
PHGLD IRU H[DPSOH FRYHUHG WKH 9LHWQDP :DU ODUJHO\ DV D µQDWLRQDO HQGHDYRXU¶
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HVSHFLDOO\LQLWVHDUO\VWDJHVDQGQHZVDQFKRUVIUHTXHQWO\UHIHUUHGWRLWDVµRXU¶Zar. 
The media representations sometimes evoked the memory of the Second World War. 
The same themes applied in the coverage of the 1991 Iraq War, probably to an even 
JUHDWHU H[WHQW WKDQ LQ WKH 9LHWQDP :DU¶V HDUO\ \HDUV (Hallin, 1986, p.142; Hallin, 
1994, p.53). 
A flip side of such framing of war is that internal dissent is highly 
underreported or misrepresented. In the first two weeks of the 1991 Iraq War, only 
1.5 per cent of news sources that three major U.S. commercial television networks 
used were anti-war protesters. Images of the protests in the mainstream media were 
often put side by side with images of U.S. flag burning in anti-American 
demonstrations in Arab states, aiming to demonstrate the irrational character of anti-
war protesters in the U.S. (Kellner, 2004, p.143, 145). The space for anti-war protest 
remained roughly similar in the U.S. media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War, but rose 
somewhat in the British media and in Al Jazeera (Aday et al., 2005, p.13; Goddard et 
al., 2008, p.16)7KH%ULWLVKFDVHVXJJHVWVWKDWHYHQLIWKHFRXQWU\¶VHQWU\LQWRZDULV
highly contested in the political arena and news media coverage, and public opinion 
is initially largely against military involvement along the lines suggested by 
government, once the war has begun critical voices tend to moderate their positions 
and media reporting largely reverts to supporting the official policy. The news media 
narrowed down access for the anti-war activists and even that which existed became 
increasingly unsympathetic (Murray et al., 2008, p.22-23). 
Civil wars are hardly less important than inter-state wars. If anything, their 
human and other consequences are even more severe. Between 1945 and 1999, 
there were five times more civil wars (counting civil wars of both ideological and 
ethnic variety) than those between states and this proportion also applies to the loss 
of life. Civil wars were considerably longer than inter-state wars, unfolded in 73 states 
and produced a far greater number of refugees (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p.75). The 
media representations of civil wars and humanitarian crises share important features 
ZLWK WKRVHRIZDUVEHWZHHQVWDWHV7KHPHGLDFDQUHSRUWRQ WKHLUFRXQWU\¶V LQWHUQDO
conflicts or, alternatively, on international ± IRUHLJQRUµRWKHUSHRSOHV¶¶± conflicts.  
Various frames feature in western media coverage of violent conflicts within 
developing countries. The Cold War frame was very popular before the 1990s, even 
if reported conflicts had little to do with the rivalry of superpowers. The end of 
FRPPXQLVP DQG WKH ULVH RI QHZ FLYLO ZDUV ERRVWHG WKH SRSXODULW\ RI WKH µDQFLHQW
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HWKQLF KDWUHGV¶ IUDPH :HVWHUQ FRUUHVSRQGHQWV DQG FRPPHQWDWRUV ZKR FRYHUHG
conflicts surrounding the breakup of Yugoslavia and its aftermath ± i.e., Croatia, 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia ± often suggested that violence originated from the 
pre-modern nature of the Balkans and deep and irreconcilable divisions between 
groups and hatreds, which their members supposedly held for those across the 
ethnic divide. Likewise, media representations of political conflicts in African states 
KDYHORQJLQYROYHGQHJDWLYHVWHUHRW\SHVDQGUHOLHGRQWKHWKHPHVRIµDQFLHQWKDWUHGV¶
DQGµWULEDOLVP¶DµVHFRQG-FODVVWHUPIRU³HWKQLFJURXS´¶7KHFLYLOZDUDQGJHQRFLGHLQ
Rwanda were reported as the slaughter of Tutsi by Hutu, i.e., just another instance of 
age-old cyclical killing sprees in the region (Carruthers, 2004, p.163-164). Scholars 
are highly critical of such simplistic views and point to a distinctly modern, as 
RSSRVHG WR µDQFLHQW HWKQLF¶ RU µWULEDO¶ FKDUDFWHU RI WKHVH FRQIOLFWV ZLWK URRWV LQ
imperial legacy and contemporary political struggles and manipulations of ethnic 
feelings by political entrepreneurs (see Gagnon, 2004; Pottier, 2002). The media 
FRYHUDJHRIµRWKHUSHRSOH¶V¶ZDrs is subject to fewer internal constraints and depends 
on international factors to a much larger extent than the coverage of conflicts by 
GRPHVWLF PHGLD $V D UHVXOW LW LV OHVV UHOHYDQW WR 0H&R'(0 SURMHFW¶V UHVHDUFK
agenda than the coverage of domestic violent conflicts. 
The Rwandan conflict in 1994 is probably the most cited example of how 
domestic media framing contributed to extreme violence. Some authors argue that 
pro-government radio broadcasts (RTLM) supplied listeners with ideas that pushed 
them to simultaneously fear, hate and dehumanise members of the minority group 
and thus conditioned, facilitated and legitimised violence and served as an 
instrument of mobilisation for genocide. Radio was also a voice of authority that 
issued orders to kill, which were obeyed by members of the majority group (Kellow 
and Steeves, 1998; Melvern, 2004). And yet, analysis of the broadcasts suggests 
that direct media effects were highly unlikely: hateful and inciting messages were 
considerably less frequent during the first few months of the genocide, when the most 
people were killed. Tone of broadcasts was belligerent and its ideology nationalist, 
anti-RPF and hostile to Tutsi as well as pro-government. Broadcasts that preceded 
the genocide portrayed the history of Rwanda through nationalist and anti-RPF 
lenses, often with negative accounts of Tutsi actions, but there were few calls to 
DWWDFN7XWVLVGXULQJ µKLJKJHQRFLGHSHULRG¶DQGHYHQVHYHUDOZDUQLQJVQRW WRDWWDFN
FLYLOLDQV'XULQJ WKH µORZJHQRFLGHSHULRG¶ WKHUHZHUH LQIODPPDWRU\EURDGFDVWVDQG
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FDOOVWRDUPV57/0¶VEURDGFDVWUDQJHODUJHO\GLGQRWRYerlap with sites of genocidal 
violence and neither did the timing of broadcasts with timing of violence in different 
regions; most perpetrators surveyed suggested that face-to-face mobilisation and 
fear were key motives to take part in violence, rather than incitement by radio 
(Strauss, 2007, p.614-5,623-5,630). 
 Still, tKHUH LV HYLGHQFH RI µPDUJLQDO DQG FRQGLWLRQDO HIIHFWV¶ ZKLFK DUH
VLJQLILFDQWRQO\LQDEURDGHUFRQWH[WRIYLROHQFHµ5DGLRLQVWLJDWHGDOLPLWHGQXPEHURI
acts of violence, catalyzed some key actors, coordinated elites, and bolstered local 
PHVVDJHV RI YLROHQFH¶ ,W µHPEROGHQHG KDUG-liners and reinforced face to face 
mobilization, which helped those who advocated violence assert dominance and 
FDUU\RXWWKHJHQRFLGH¶(Strauss, 2007, p.630-631). More broadly, the broadcasts of 
Radio Rwanda and RTLM ± the main pro-government media ± µRWKHUHG¶WKHPLQRULW\
group by simultaneously drawing upon various constructions of Hutu and Tutsi 
LGHQWLWLHV IURP YDULRXV SDUWV RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V KLVWRU\ VXFK DV HWhnic, 
RFFXSDWLRQDOVWDWXVUDFLDODQGSROLWLFDOLGHQWLWLHV%URDGFDVWVZHUHµSRO\SKRQLF¶EXWD
key theme was the unequal power relationship. Tutsis ± the minority group ± were 
SUHVHQWHG DV µGRPLQDWLQJ RU ZDQWLQJ WR GRPLQDWH¶ +XWXV WKH PDMRULW\ JURXS
regardless of whether domination was expressed through an occupational/status 
SRVLWLRQ SDVWRUDOLVWV YV FXOWLYDWRUV UDFLDO GLIIHUHQFH µ+DPLWHV¶ YV RWKHUV DQGRU
political affiliation (the Rwandan Patriotic Front vs. National Revolutionary Movement 
for Development) (Baisley, 2014). To sum up, the media reporting on wars between 
and within states shares important features. It touches upon some of the most 
important moral and political issues, such as those of life and death of large numbers 
of people and of regional and/or global security. And yet, it may not always directly 
affect the main constitutional, political and policy issues that are of principal concern 
to the main political actors and the public back home. By contrast, the media framing 
of internal non-violent political conflicts strongly influences debates on the main 
political issues, which is the focus of the next section.  
 
4. The media coverage of institutional conflicts and popular protest 
LQµROG¶GHPRFUDFLHV 
7KLVDQGWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ¶VGLVFXVVLRQLVKLJKO\VHQVLWLYHWRGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKH
ways the news media report on political conflicts in democracies and non-democratic 
regimes. Despite a great variation in democracies with respect to who gets access to 
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the political process and the news media and who does not, and to varying levels of 
media influence that political actors normally enjoy, it is not difficult to distinguish 
between the role the media play in democratic and non-democratic regimes; whether 
democratic institutions, including press freedom, are taken seriously or not can be 
empirically assessed. This is not to say that there are no violations of press freedom 
in democracies, but only that these are not systematic (Dahl, 1989; Schmitter and 
Karl, 1996). This section explores the media coverage of electoral and other forms of 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO FRQIOLFWV DQG RI SRSXODU SURWHVW DQG VRFLDO PRYHPHQWV LQ µROG¶
democracies of Western Europe and North America, while the next section examines 
the media reporting on conflicts in non-democratic regimes and in democratisation. 
The media framing of non-YLROHQWFRQIOLFWVLQROGµFRQVROLGDWHG¶GHPRFUDFLHV
varies considerably with regard to whether it concentrates on political conflicts that 
largely unfold within or outside political institutions. The former include, for example, 
election campaigns, legislative and policy debates, while the latter involve popular 
protest and social movements. There is a broad literature on how the news media 
report on institutional conflicts in democracies and I highlight a few main points here 
and then move on to a more detailed discussion of the media framing of conflicts that 
spill over from democratic institutions to the streets, and of conflicts in non-
democratic settings. According tR WKH µLQGH[LQJ¶ WKHVLV WKDW , WRXFKHG XSRQ LQ WKH
previous section, the media coverage of politics in democracies reflects power 
relations within the political elite. The news tends to reflect elite consensus even if 
there is conflicting but trustworthy evidence from unofficial sources. Only when there 
is controversy over policy within government or between the mainstream political 
parties, the media provide contrasting perspectives on the issue. Exceptional events, 
investigative reporting and leaks, and outsider counter-spin may also open up space 
IRUFRPSHWLQJQDUUDWLYHVDQGWKXVFUHDWH µPRPHQWVRI UHODWLYH LQGHSHQGHQFH¶RI WKH
media (Bennett, 1990; p.106-7; Bennett et al., 2007, p.48-50,62-68,106). 
This argument implies that in those areas in which a robust political 
competition is highly institutionalised ± because these stand at the very centre of the 
democratic process ± and is reflected in specific norms that govern press behaviour, 
such as in election campaigns, the media routinely present competing frames. 
Various devices support such framing, including frequent independent introduction of 
public opinion polls, with positive connotation. By contrast, those areas in which there 
are no such rules for press behaviour and in which there is often elite consensus, 
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such as national security and foreign policy, the media largely relay the official 
perspective (Bennett, 1990, p.106-107; Bennett et al., 2007, p. 48-50). It appears that 
legislative and policy debates on domestic issues are somewhere in between. Policy 
uncertainty is another factor that may increase media influence. The lack of policy or 
policy consensus within the government and political elite produces competing media 
framing with regard to foreign policy (Robinson, 2002). The assumption remains, 
however, that these are exceptional moments. Recent research on policy uncertainty 
in other policy areas suggests a more complex answer. The underlying conditions in 
modern policy systems provide ample space for alternative interpretations of 
problems or solutions and thus amplify rifts in government. These divisions in turn 
may produce policy uncertainty, but the media may not take up these opportunities to 
engage in policy debates, and their potential to shape policy varies across policy 
domains (Howarth, 2010). 
The coverage of election campaigns follows elaborate rules that aim to provide 
a level playing field for the competition of political candidates and/or political parties 
IRUWKHFLWL]HQV¶YRWH0DQ\VWXGLHVRIWKHPHGLDFRYHUDJHRIHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQVRYHU
several decades, especially in the U.S., have revealed that there is little partisan bias 
in news reporting. Partisanship exists but is largely reserved for editorial writers and 
commentators (Berelson et al., 1954; '¶$OHVVLR DQG $OOHQ, 2000). The coverage of 
election campaigns puts less emphasis on substantive issues and more on 
strategies, poll results and the chances that some candidates would win the contest. 
7KH µJDPH IUDPH¶ LQWHUSUHWV HOHFWLRQV IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI VSRUWV FRQWHVWV RU
horse races: being contests with uncertain results, elections have high news value 
(Patterson, 1980) 7KH MRXUQDOLVWV¶ IRFXV RQ VWUDWHJLHV KRZHYHU JRHV ZHOO EH\RQG
HOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQVDQGRIWHQWDNHVWKHIRUPRIµVWUDWHJ\IUDPH¶ZKLFKSXWVHPSKDVLV
RQWKHSROLWLFLDQV¶RSSRUWXQLVWLFPRWLYHVDVRSSRVHGWRDVXEVWDQWLYHSROLF\DJHQGD
Such strategic (as opposed to issue-based) coverage increases political cynicism, 
which undermines the quality of democracy (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). 
,QVWLWXWLRQDOFRQIOLFWV LQ µROG¶GHPRFUDFLHVDUHVLPLODUWRZDUVDQGFLYLOZDUVLQ
the sense that the focus of media attention is principally on elites. But an important 
aspect of media framing of political struggles in democracies involves conflicts in 
which non-elites and political outsiders feature as key conflict parties, principally in 
the form of popular protests and social movements. The main feature of popular 
protests is a disruptive action that aims to mobilise public opinion and put pressure 
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on its opponents. It is therefore a political resource of ordinary people, who lack 
regular access to the political process, information, organisational and financial 
UHVRXUFHVDQGDFFHVVWRWKHPHGLD3URWHVWHUV¶VXFFHVV± in terms of achieving their 
particular goals ± does not depend on the direct use of power, but on indirect 
persuasion mediated by the news media and by other political actors. Social 
movements, on the other hand, are those instances of popular protest that are 
sustained over time. By acting upon their common interests, ordinary people mobilize 
consensus partly by drawing on deeply rooted feelings of solidarity or identity (della 
Porta and Diani, 1999, p.14-16,167-170; Tarrow, 2011, p.9-12). 
While using unconventional action against their opponents, social movements 
do it with an eye on the mass audience that they can reach through the media 
coverage of their action. They use the media to mobilise support among the general 
public since its other channels of communication are not sufficient. The media 
coverage of a movement also grants it credibility as an important player, which is 
necessary to have any impact, and helps expand the range of players in conflict, 
ZKLFK LQFUHDVHV WKH PRYHPHQW¶V LQIOXHQFH ,Q WXUQ VRFLDO PRYHPHQWV RIIHU GUDPD
conflict, action and photo opportunities (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993, p.116-117). 
Movements also rely on the media for information about the position of authorities, 
other opponents and the general public on the issues that they consider important 
and also learn about their actions from this source. Therefore, movements depend on 
the media for strategic information on which they develop their action strategies, but 
DOVR XVH WKHP DV D µVRXQGLQJ ERDUG¶ IRU WKH DVVHVVPHQW RI VWUDWHJLHV WKHLU
opponents and allies largely follow the same route (Koopmans, 2004, p.370). 
In the 1960s and the 1970s, the mainstream media reported popular protest 
ODUJHO\E\GUDZLQJRQWKHµODZDQGRUGHU¶IUDPHZKLFKLGHQWLILHGSURWHVWHUVQRWVLPSO\
as unconventional but as outright deviant. This frame put emphasis on the violence 
and drama of protest, while shifting attention away from their goals and undermining 
their legitimacy as political actors. A prominent example is the media coverage of the 
New Left in the U.S. in the 1960s. Large anti-war protests brought media attention to 
the student movement. The media trivialised its goals and other important features, 
presented the movement parallel with counter-SURWHVWV WR KLJKOLJKW LWV µH[WUHPLVP¶
emphasised internal disputes, presented protesters as deviant or unrepresentative of 
broader currents in society, deliberately underestimated their numbers and derided 
their effectiveness. When parts of the anti-war movement turned more militant, media 
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coverage introduced new angles in reporting. It relied on the official sources and 
representations, focused on communists within the movements as well as symbols 
WKDW PDGH WKHP DSSHDU µXQSDWULRWLF¶ DQG YLROHQW LW DOVR GHOHJLWLPLVHG WKHLU DFWLRQV
WKURXJKWKHXVHRITXRWDWLRQPDUNVHJµSHDFHPDUFK¶DQGE\LQFUHDVLQJIRFXVRQ
the right-wing opposition to the movement (Gitlin, 1980, p.27-28). 
Such media coverage triggered divisions and power shifts within the 
movement. Growing media attention helped recruit activists but increasingly it 
attracted those who were enthralled by the content of the coverage, and not by more 
complex initial goals of the movement, which in turn strengthened more radical parts 
of the movement in relation to others. All movements face this sort of framing and 
have to endure pressures that transform leaders into celebrities, put emphasis on 
H[WUDYDJDQW EHKDYLRXU DQG WULJJHU µWUDQVLWLRQDO FULVHV RI JHQHUDWLRQV¶ DV ZHOO DV
encourage a showdown between moderate and radical factions. Those movements 
with reformist (as opposed to revolutionary) goals can achieve media credibility more 
easily since they are more aligned to the prevailing news frames in democracies; 
those with revolutionary goals, by contrast, can retain media coverage only as 
µGHYLDQWV¶ ZKLFK LQ WXUQ HDUQV WKHP HYHQ PRUH GLVSDUDJLQJ IUDPLQJ (Gitlin, 1980, 
p.30-31,286-287). 
The media coverage of popular protest and social movements and their overall 
status in democracies has changed considerably since, which is reflected in the term 
µVRFLDO PRYHPHQW VRFLHW\¶ WKDW VFKRODUV FRLQHG LQ WKH V (Meyer and Tarrow, 
1998). State officials remain privileged in terms of media framing, but the media also 
keep a repertoire of anti-DXWKRULW\IUDPHV7KHµSRZHUFRUUXSWV¶IUDPHZKLFKLVDERXW
WKHFRUUXSWLRQFUXHOW\RULQFRPSHWHQFHRIWKHSRZHUIXORULJLQDWHVIURPµLQYHVWLgative 
UHSRUWLQJ¶ DQG D EURDGHU MRXUQDOLVWLF EHOLHI WKDW WKH\ VKRXOG SHUIRUP WKH UROH RI
µZDWFKGRJ¶$QRWKHU LV WKH µLQQRFHQWYLFWLPV¶IUDPHZKLFKSUHYDLOV LQZDU MRXUQDOLVP
but becomes relevant in the coverage of popular protest when protesters suffer at the 
hands of the police (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.37-39). The media also serve as an important 
channel through which popular protest is diffused in democracies. The lack of 
organisational resources required to recruit activists and mobilise public support is 
coPSHQVDWHG E\ WKH PHGLD¶V WUDQVPLVVLRQ RI SURWHVWHUV¶ PHVVDJHV WR PDVV
audiences, which brings attention to their goals and facilitates emulation (Walgrave 
and Manssens, 2000). Participants in protest events also learn through media 
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coverage ± and especiall\WKURXJKWHOHYLVLRQFRYHUDJH¶VYLVXDOGHPRQVWUDWLRQ± how 
WRSURWHVWDQGKRZWRUHVSRQGWRWKHLURSSRQHQWV¶DFWLRQV 
Some social movement scholars examine the extent to which the media 
faithfully represent popular protests by studying historical cases of protest through 
PHGLD DUFKLYHV µPHGLD WUDFHV¶ DQG E\ FRPSDULQJ WKHP ZLWK GDWD FROOHFWHG IURP
other sources, such as police and other official records and participant observation. 
Early studies suggested that newspapers were highly selective in terms of reporting 
on protests: size and location of the event were principal criteria for selection and the 
reporting of national and local media outlets differed considerably (Danzger, 1975; 
Snyder and Kelly, 1977). More recent studies provide a more complex picture. One 
quantitative study collected evidence from the official records (permits) of all 
demonstrations in Washington D.C. in 1982 and 1991, and compared them to 
representations in the mainstream print and electronic media in the United States. It 
found amSOH HYLGHQFH RI ZKDW DXWKRUV FDOOHG WKH µVHOHFWLRQ ELDV¶ 2QO\ D VPDOO
number of demonstrations were reported and only very large protests were covered. 
The positioning of the issue at the centre of demonstrations within a media attention 
cycle also mattered: when media coverage focused on a particular issue, protests 
that were aligned to the theme were more likely to get coverage, especially in 
electronic media. This trend suggested that the news media played an important role 
in agenda setting (McCarthy et al., 1996, p.494-495). 
7KHVH VFKRODUV DOVR H[SORUHG WKH µGHVFULSWLRQ ELDV¶ WKDW LV D JDS EHWZHHQ
features of those protest events that were reported and their representations in the 
news media, focusing on information that was omitted, misrepresented and framed 
with elements of information that were reported. They found that the media framing of 
demonstrations was largely accurate with respect to key forms of action, such as 
speeches, marching, singing and placarding. Those forms of action that prevailed in 
protest events were also those that dominated in reporting. Therefore, the news 
media did not typically stress incidents in relation to other features of protest events. 
(OHFWURQLF PHGLD FRYHUDJH ZDV PRUH µWKHPDWLF¶ ± focused on the historical and/or 
ideological context behind events ± WKDQ µHSLVRGLF¶ LH IRFXVHG RQ WKH HYHQWV¶
SDUWLFXODUIHDWXUHVWKHUHZDVDOVRDWHPSRUDOVKLIWIURPµHSLVRGLF¶WRPRUHµWKHPDWLF¶
coverage (McCarthy et al., 1998, p.117-26; McPhail, 1998, p.190; Smith et al., 2001). 
Social movement scholars argue for the most part that popular protests and 
social movements have become an important part of the contemporary democratic 
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SURFHVV :KLOH LPDJHV RI WKH µPDGGLQJ FURZG¶ SUHYDLOHG LQ ERWK HOLWH DQG PDVV
perceptions of popular protest in the first half of the twentieth century (McPhail, 
1991), DQG RQO\ VOLJKWO\ ORRVHQHG XS LQ WKH V DQG WKH V WKH µVRFLDO
PRYHPHQW UHSHUWRLUH¶ KDV QRZ VSUHDG ZLGHO\ LQ µROG¶ GHPRFUDFLHV ,W LV EURDGO\
accepted as part of democratic politics by both elites and citizens at large and is 
regulated in detail, which has reduced its more disorderly features. In other words, 
popular protest has become institutionalised (see Meyer and Tarrow, 1998). In the 
context of newly established democratic regimes, the institutionalisation of popular 
protest is considered to be an important indicator that democracy has become 
consolidated (Ekiert and Kubik, 1999). As a result, popular protests and social 
movements get coverage not too dissimilar from that of political parties, interest 
grRXSVDQGRWKHUµOHJLWLPDWH¶DFWRUV7KHPHGLDIRFXVQRWRQO\RQWKHµVSHFWDFOH¶EXW
DOVR RQ PRYHPHQWV¶ JRDOV DQG SROLF\ SURSRVDOV WKRXJK LW UHPDLQV KDUGHU IRU
protesters to sustain media interest. One could argue therefore that empirical 
evidence about the shift in media representations of protest over time simply reflects 
the new status of popular protest in democratic politics. 
The alternative explanation is that protest coverage (and thus potentially 
coverage of other parts of the political process) has become more media-centric: it 
has more to do with a media attention cycle, that is, media agenda-setting, and less 
with the promotion of public awareness and understanding of the issues that 
protesters advocate. Bearing in mind earlier findings about the importance of a media 
attention cycle in the selection of protests, it appears that the news media tend to 
pick and choose events for reporting mostly in line with cycles of attention to 
substantive topics. Apparently, the media tend to cover those protests than fit into 
existing coverage of certain themes. One implication is that one of the few legitimate 
channels through which citizens can signal their preferences to the authorities ± in 
addition to elections and public opinion polls ± is now undermined (McCarthy et al., 
1996, p.497; 1998, p. 127). 
 
 
5. The media framing of conflict in non-democratic regimes and in 
democratisation 
Non-democratic regimes rely on the news media as one of many instruments 
to preserve their power. They are rarely monolithic, however, and the media face 
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different constraints in different regime types. The most influential typology of modern 
non-democratic regimes distinguishes between totalitarian, post-totalitarian, 
authoritarian and sultanist regimes, according to the criteria of pluralism, ideology, 
leadership and mobilization (Linz and Stepan, 1996; p.38-54; Linz, 2000). Totalitarian 
regimes, such as those in Germany under Hitler or the Soviet Union under Stalin, 
featured a highly repressive and ideological one-party rule ± with charismatic and 
highly unpredictable leadership ± which aimed to destroy social, economic and 
political pluralism and involved extensive top-down mobilization. The regimes 
considered the media as tools of regime propaganda and of mobilization of the 
population for regime purposes, while the communists also put emphasis on their role 
in educating the public to facilitate a major social transformation. Post-totalitarian 
regimes originated from de-Stalinization and involved a repressive, but highly 
predictable single-party rule, with formalistic ideology, extensive institutional but 
limited social and economic pluralism, and little mass mobilization. While totalitarian 
grip on the media relaxed considerably (as did its educational purpose), the media 
remained state owned and were expected to boost public support for the communist 
rule and to de-legitimise other worldviews. 
Authoritarian regimes (such as non-communist regimes of Southern Europe, 
6RXWK $PHULFD DQG (DVW $VLD EHIRUH WKH µWKLUG ZDYH¶ DQG &KLQD¶V UHJLPH WRGD\
involve extensive economic, social and institutional, but limited, political pluralism, 
and also feature highly predictable rule, with little focus on ideology and mobilization, 
but with distinctive mentalities (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p.38-51;  Linz, 2000). Some of 
these regimes consider the media as an important industry and provide ample 
investment for technological development to increase competitiveness internationally 
(Voltmer, 2013, p.77). Finally, sultanist regimes, on the model of Mobutu in Zaire or 
0DUFRV¶V 3KLOLSSLQHV DUH H[WUHPH SHUVRQDOLVW QHR-patrimonial) rulerships in which 
there is arbitrary rule with little space for ideology, mobilization and the opposition, 
but with tendencies towards dynastic and familial power. Extensive control over the 
PHGLDRIWHQJRHVWRJHWKHUZLWKDWWHPSWVWREXLOGWKHOHDGHU¶VSHUVRQDOLW\FXOW but is 
sometimes undermined by weak state and weak technological penetration of society 
(Chehabi and Linz, 1998)7KH µWKLUGZDYH¶RIGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ LQ WKH ODVWTXDUWHURI
the twentieth century spread across all world regions, but domestic and international 
pressures for democracy often resulted in hybrid regimes, which mix democratic 
procedures with authoritarian governance. Independent media exist in such regimes, 
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but face various obstacles in their operation. The government enjoys formal or 
informal control over the most powerful (especially electronic) media and often 
prevents opposition forces from gaining access to these media (Diamond, 2002; 
Levitsky and Way, 2010). 
Non-democratic regimes rarely use the media solely as propaganda 
machines. Many have the capacity to create and sustain powerful frames that 
mobilise loyalty among the population (Voltmer, 2013, p.66). The narrative of 
economic development and modernisation is often strategically deployed, and 
relayed through the media, to boost the legitimacy of non-democratic rulers. East 
Asian states of the 1970s and the 1980s are often cited in this respect, but the 
communists in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also drew much of their 
authority from this frame early on, as did military governments in Latin America in the 
1960s and the 1970s. In decades after de-colonisation in Asia and Africa, the frame 
of the anti-colonial struggle remained a powerful vehicle for boosting the legitimacy of 
non-democratic rulers, who often equalled opposition to their rule with disloyalty to 
the state. More exclusive nationalist frames, based on national/ethnic victimisation 
and stereotypes towards others, have frequently been employed at least partly with 
the aim of preserving the power for non-democratic rule, not least in Serbia and 
&URDWLDLQWKHHDUO\VWDJHVRI<XJRVODYLD¶VEUHDNXS(Woodward, 1995; 9ODGLVDYOMHYLü, 
2008). 
A default media strategy of most non-democratic regimes in dealing with 
SROLWLFDORSSRVLWLRQDQGSRSXODUSURWHVW LQJHQHUDO LV WRSURPRWH WKH µODZDQGRUGHU¶
frame. Oppositional activities are officially considered to be attempts to undermine 
political stabLOLW\DQG WRFUHDWH µFKDRV¶DQG µXQFHUWDLQW\¶QRW OHDVW LQ WKH LQWHUHVWVRI
µIRUHLJQSRZHUV¶6LPXOWDQHRXVO\WKHIORZRILQIRUPDWLRQLVOLPLWHGWKURXJKFHQVRUVKLS
and/or informal pressures on the media to prevent the diffusion of popular 
mobilisation. Some regimes frame and deal with all protests in the same way ± both 
anti-regime protests and those that feature particularist demands of industrial 
workers, ethnic minorities and other groups; other regimes take pains to co-opt some 
groups for ideological and other reasons, which is reflected in their media framing. 
)RU H[DPSOH SURWHVWV E\ LQGXVWULDO ZRUNHUV¶ ZHUH DOZD\V GHDOW ZLWK FDUHIXOO\ LQ
communist states due to their strategic ideological position in communist ideology, 
which was fully reflected in the official media coverage 9ODGLVDYOMHYLü, 2008). In 
many authoritarian and hybrid regimes the media take part in the broader 
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authoritarian manipulation package that aims less at mobilising loyalty among the 
public and more at undermining alternatives to non-democratic rule. This does not 
simply refer to political opposition, but also to information alternatives, music 
DOWHUQDWLYHVDQGPD\HYHQLQFOXGHWKHµGHVWUXFWLRQRIVRFLDELOLW\¶(Gordy, 1999). 
While playing an important part in the survival of non-democratic regimes in 
some periods, the media may also undermine them in other periods. There is ample 
evidence that the fall of authoritarian regimes, including military regimes, begins with 
FRQIOLFWEHWZHHQµKDUG-OLQH¶DQGµVRIW-OLQH¶SROLWLFLDQVZLWKLQWKe ruling elite, which often 
WULJJHUV WKH µUHVXUUHFWLRQRIFLYLOVRFLHW\¶ (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Likewise, 
unexpected domestic and external events in hybrid regimes may suddenly undermine 
regime incumbents and strengthen opposition forces. In these contexts, the media 
are suddenly released from many constraints in the reporting of elite and mass 
conflicts and, if they take this opportunity, may strongly influence events and facilitate 
GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ7KLV ORJLFPLUURUV WKH µLQGH[LQJ¶RISRZHUUHODtions by the media in 
western democracies. This is less likely to occur in post-totalitarian and sultanist 
regimes because they are more resilient to elite conflict. In the former case, the 
single party provides its officials more incentives to stick together in the face of 
uncertainty so that they largely tend to break down under non-YLROHQWSUHVVXUHµIURP
EHORZ¶ (see Geddes, 1999). In the latter case, an autocrat has already removed 
potential credible successors from the political process so that regime collapse is 
likely to occur through a military coup or revolutionary violence (Snyder, 1998; 
Goodwin, 2001). In both cases, a severe regime crisis or collapse precedes the 
PHGLD¶VPRUHLQGHSHQGHQWUROH 
Two aspects of the media are especially relevant in democratisation: 
technology and framing. Communication technologies, including traditional and new 
media, aid democratisation principally by facilitating diffusion ± the transmission of 
ideas, institutions, policies, models and forms of action from one country to another 
(Whitehead, 2001; Bunce and Wolchik, 2011). And diffusion, in turn, is one of the 
main reasons why democracy appears to spread in waves (Huntington, 1991). The 
µWKLUG ZDYH¶ RI GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ LQYROYHG VHYHUDO VPDOOHU UHJLRQDO ZDYHV LQ ZKLFK
democracy was established (or non-democratic regimes were liberalised) in several 
countries within a short period, all in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The 
µFRORXUHGUHYROXWLRQV¶LQSRVW-communist authoritarian states followed in the next few 
\HDUV DQG PRUH UHFHQWO\ WKH µ$UDE 6SULQJ¶ DFURVV PXFK RI 1RUWK $IULFD DQG WKH
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Middle East. The media facilitate diffusion by spreading alternative information. 
Firstly, a gradual spread of knowledge about alternative, more successful political 
and economic models shapes the attitudes, expectations and interpretations of the 
public and may undermine the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes, which, for 
example, occurred despite censorship in Eastern Europe under communism 
(Whitehead, 2001). Secondly, the media spread information about anti-regime 
protests. Even heavily censored information in the media under regime control ± and 
information broadcast by international (foreign) media ± about other protests in the 
country or across the border signals to actual and potential regime opponents that 
popular protest is possible and shows (especially on television), how it could be 
organised. 7KH HPXODWLRQ RI SUHYLRXVO\ VXFFHVVIXO µGHPRFUDWLF UHYROXWLRQV¶ PD\
trigger widespread anti-regime protests (and perhaps even trigger regime 
breakdown) even in those countries in which structural conditions ± such as 
underdevelopment, severe internal ethnic and other divisions, and the lack of 
democratic traditions ± hardly favour the establishment of democracy (Beissinger, 
2007). 
A cultural and political similarity, along with geographic proximity, facilitate 
diffusion of democracy by aiding emulation. SeUELD¶V µGHPRFUDWLF UHYROXWLRQ¶ ZKLFK
UHPRYHG 0LORãHYLü IURP SRZHU LQ  VWURQJO\ LQIOXHQFHG RSSRVLWLRQ SURWHVWV LQ
other post-communist states in the following years because they shared the legacy of 
both communist and post-communist non-democratic rule (Beissinger, 2007; Bunce 
and Wolchik, 2011). Popular protest against Arab autocratic rulers spread even faster 
from one country to another ± within months and weeks ± since the audience in all 
Arab countries could follow events directly on satellite television channels that 
EURDGFDVWLQ$UDELF,WKHOSHGWKDWWKHµSXEOLFVSKHUH¶KDGHPHUJHGLQWKH$UDEZRUOG
in previous years, principally under the influence of satellite channels Al Jazeera and 
Al Arabiya (Lynch, 2012; see also Jebril et al., 2013). The spread of anti-regime 
protests, however, was also constrained by the factors that initially promoted 
diffusion. There was little emulation of anti-regime protests in neighbouring non-Arab 
countries with non-democratic regimes. Initial optimism about the prospects of 
democratisation in Arab countries ultimately faced the reality of political, economic 
DQG RWKHU FRQGLWLRQV DGYHUVH WR GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ MXVW OLNH DIWHU WKH µFRORXUHG
UHYROXWLRQV¶LQWKHIRUPHU6RYLHW8QLRQ 
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Media framing also matters. The foreign media coverage of authoritarian 
EUHDNGRZQ DPLGVW PDVVLYH SRSXODU PRELOLVDWLRQ RIWHQ HPSOR\V WKH µSHRSOH SRZHU¶
frame, which provides encouragement to those involved in the struggle and helps 
WKHPVHFXUH LQWHUQDWLRQDOVXSSRUW2Q WKHHYHRIFRPPXQLVP¶VFROOapse in Eastern 
Europe, the frame drew on the efforts of political dissidents and informal opposition to 
frame anti-UHJLPHUHVLVWDQFHVWUDWHJLFDOO\WKURXJKWKHGLVFRXUVHRIµFLYLOVRFLHW\¶HYHQ
if its organisational underpinnings were largely absent. It stressed the injustice of 
V\VWHPDWLFYLRODWLRQVRIKXPDQULJKWVE\ WKHUHSUHVVLYHVWDWHVSRNHDERXW µFLWL]HQV¶
(as opposed to classes or nations) and offered the solution of popular protest as the 
way of promoting political reforms (see Glenn, 2001, p.50-51) 7KH µSHRSOH SRZHU¶
frame centres on non-violence as a way to establish democracy and is reflected in 
ERWK LQWHUQDWLRQDODQG GRPHVWLFPHGLD¶V FRORXUIXO ODEHOOLQJ RI SRSXODUPRELOLVDWLRQ
against non-democratic rule to clearly distinguish it from old-style revolutionary 
YLROHQFH3RUWXJDO¶Vµ5HYROXWLRQRIWKH&DUQDWLRQV¶LQ&]HFKRVORYDNLD¶Vµ9HOYHW
5HYROXWLRQ¶ RU µ5HIROXWLRQ¶ LQ  WKH µ&RORXUHG 5HYROXWLRQV¶ LQ SRVW-communist 
states ± 6HUELD¶V µ%XOOGR]HU 5HYROXWLRQ¶ *HRUJLD¶V µ5RVH 5HYROXWLRQ¶ 8NUDLQH¶V
µ2UDQJH5HYROXWLRQ¶DQG.\UJ\]VWDQ¶Vµ7XOLS5HYROXWLRQ¶LQ± /HEDQRQ¶Vµ&HGDU
5HYROXWLRQ¶LQDQGWKHµ$UDE6SULQJ¶LQ-2012. 
%\ IHDWXULQJ FRQIURQWDWLRQ HPRWLRQ DQG YLVXDOLW\ WKH µGUDPD RI GHPRFUDWLF
WUDQVLWLRQV¶LVZHOODOLJQed with high news values, which secures extensive coverage 
in foreign media (Voltmer, 2013; p.93). The drama of regime change in media 
representations reflects a deep-seated conflict between contrasting visions of a 
FRXQWU\¶V SROLWLFDO GHYHORSPHQW DQG JUHDt uncertainty, but also arises from the 
µVWUDWHJLFGUDPDWXUJ\¶RIVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVWKDWSXVKIRUSROLWLFDOFKDQJH (McAdam, 
2000; Garton Ash, 2009, p.383-384). Recognisable visual frames of democratisation 
also emerge and shape how anti-regime protests evolve. Most people remember 
democratisation in specific countries ± or democratisation in general ± by referring to 
µLFRQLF¶LPDJHVVXFKDVWKRVHRIWKHSHRSOHGDQFLQJRQWKH%HUOLQ:DOODQGRIVHYHUDO
hundred thousand protesters braving freezing weather for D PRQWK LQ 8NUDLQH¶V
Orange Revolution (Voltmer, 2013, p.63). 
There is no consensus among scholars about the media framing of different 
stages of democratisation. Some studies seem to suggest that authoritarian 
breakdown, which lifts restrictions on the press freedom, tends to be followed by 
µZLOG¶ PHGLD SOXUDOLVP WKDW LV UHIOHFWHG LQ FRPSHWLQJ DQG FRQIURQWDWLRQDO IUDPLQJ RI
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politics. In a way, the lack of press freedom under the old regime tends to be 
overcompensated after regime breakdown, at least until the dust settles, i.e., until the 
media stage becomes more commercialised and/or the previously accumulated 
oppositional energy is dissipated. For example, whilst the media provided information 
about various political actors and policy proposals in transitions from authoritarianism 
in Africa and Latin America, there was ample negative coverage and denouncements 
of old regime politicians and of some from the new government in many countries, as 
well as little effort to foster a meaningful debate on the key issues of political 
development (Randall, 1993, p.641-642). The unintended consequence of such 
media framing of conflict, in the context in which a broader social consensus about 
democracy does not exist, may be to undermine a new democratic government, 
perhaps even facilitate democratic erosion or breakdown. 
Other studies show, in contrast, that the media coverage of democratisation is 
less confrontational in democratic transition than in democratic consolidation. The 
content analysis of the mainstream aQG UHJLRQDO SUHVV FRYHUDJH RI 6SDLQ¶V
democratisation after the death of Franco revealed the framing of key moments in 
GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQDVEURDGO\V\PSDWKHWLFWRDQGVXSSRUWLYHRIJRYHUQPHQW¶VHIIRUWVWR
introduce political and economic reforms. The shared focus of coverage was on the 
introduction of democratic institutions through reconciliation and forgetting of the 
past, and through territorial decentralisation. Oppositional activities were gradually 
accorded greater space in the media coverage, which became more confrontational 
as democratic institutions had taken roots. The press strongly contributed to 
successful democratisation by acting as an unofficial partner to the government and 
opposition in the elite pact that promoted democracy and reflected a broad social 
consensus (Barrera and Zugasti, 2006, p.28-30,32-34).  
Another hypothesis is also worth considering: how media frame conflicts in 
different stages of democratisation depends principally on other factors, such as the 
mode of transition and prior regime type. In pacted transitions (e.g., Spain after 
Franco), the media coverage of politics is less confrontational because the media do 
not want to undermine a co-operation between old regime soft-liners and opposition 
moderates upon which new democratic institutions are being built; a more adversarial 
media reporting occurs only later, when a direct threat of democratic breakdown has 
already subsided and democratic institutions have become more resilient. In 
revolutionary transitions, in contrast, a dampened media coverage of politics does not 
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last long because a direct threat of democratic breakdown is absent so there is no 
significant difference between stages of democratisation in this respect (e.g., Serbia 
DIWHU0LORãHYLü$OVR LWPD\ZHOO EH What the lifting of censorship leads to a highly 
pluralistic media scene and the confrontational coverage of politics early on in 
transitions from highly repressive and durable non-democratic regimes only (such as 
those in Eastern Europe after communism and some authoritarian regimes in 
developing countries towards the end of the Cold War), which subsides over time 
once the public gets used to political pluralism, and not in transitions from less 
repressive non-democratic regimes, such as contemporary hybrid regimes. 
Transition to democracy is considered to be over when free, fair and 
competitive elections exist, when the basic freedoms, such as those of speech, press 
DQGDVVRFLDWLRQDUHEURDGO\UHVSHFWHGDQGZKHQWKHUHDUHQRµUHVHUYHGGRPDLQV¶RU
nonelected bodies that prevent elected officials from exerting full control over the 
main levers of power (Dahl, 1989, p.221; O'Donnell, 1996, p,35; Schmitter and Karl, 
1996, p.55-56). In short, democracy is about competitive elections and those 
freedoms and conditions that make such elections possible. During and after the 
¶WKLUGZDYH¶PDQ\UHJLPHVFURVVHGWKHWKUHVKROGRIGHPRFUDF\7KH\UHVHPEOHROG
democracies by establishing the vertical accountability of elected officials to citizens 
by way of elections. Still, they remain low-quality democracies in which the rule of law 
is absent and clientelism and corruption prevail. The executive largely ignores 
constitutional limits to its power and dominates the legislature, the judiciary and 
various agencies of horizontal accountability, and thus creates space for arbitrary and 
ineffective rule, hindering long-term prospects of economic growth and democratic 
development (O'Donnell, 1996; 1998). 
In the absence of high levels of conflict that often occurs during transition from 
non-GHPRFUDWLFUXOHIRUHLJQPHGLDWHQGWRORVHLQWHUHVWLQµURXWLQH¶FRQIOLFWVVXFKDV
those over citizenship, distribution of power, elections and transitional justice. The 
coverage of such conflicts by domestic media is likely to reflect the political context in 
which there is no accountability of elected officials to other branches of government, 
ZLWKKLJK OHYHOVRISRODULVDWLRQ IRVWHUHGE\DUELWUDU\ UXOHDQG µLUUHVSRQVLEOH¶SROLWLFDO
pluralism. In this context, the mediatisation of politics might threaten the very 
foundations of democratic institutions or help entrench the low-quality democracy, not 
least by facilitating populist tendencies, undermining emerging political parties and 
fostering cynicism among citizens (see Voltmer, 2013, p.51,97-100). New 
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democracies sharply divided along ethnic, linguistic, racial and ideological lines ± 
especially after large-scale violence ± and thus in need of inclusive politics, may find 
that confrontational media framing of most, even routine political issues brings into 
question not only their new democratic institutions, but also the very foundations of 
the state. 
 
6. Lessons for further study of the media framing of democratisation conflicts 
This overview of the literature on the media framing of political conflict reveals 
a fractured field. There is an extensive literature on how media report on inter-state 
and civil wars, on election campaigns, other institutionalised conflicts and social 
movements in western democracies, as well as on conflicts in non-democratic 
regimes and democratising states ± and on the causes and consequences of such 
coverage. And yet, there are only limited attempts to draw parallels between the 
media coverage of disparate conflicts and little cross-fertilisation of findings from the 
disparate literatures, just like in the study of other aspects of different types of 
political conflict. Much of the literature discusses the ways in which western media 
frame foreign conflicts and domestic election campaigns and policy debates, while 
there is considerably less focus on the media framing of domestic conflicts in non-
western settings, such as those that arise during and after transitions from non-
democratic rule. 
This overview of the literature reveals that the political context appears to be 
an important factor that shapes the media framing of various forms of political 
conflict. Several dimensions of the political context matter in this respect, such as 
regime type, international (foreign) or domestic perspective, elite consensus or 
conflict, policy consensus or uncertainty, type of conflict, policy area, a more or less 
institutionalised nature of the political conflict at stake, and the stage of 
democratisation. Also, the literature suggests that media framing strongly influences 
political outcomes and thus fosters or undermines democratic institutions in new 
democracies in various ways. The following insights seem to be especially relevant 
for the study of media framing of those democratisation conflicts that are at the centre 
RI 0H&R'(0¶V UHVHDUFK agenda, i.e., conflicts over citizenship, transitional justice, 
distribution of power and elections in four democratising states: Egypt, Kenya, Serbia 
and South Africa (for details see Kraetzschmar and Voltmer, 2015). 
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Comparative regime analysis suggests that regime type matters greatly when 
it comes to various political outcomes, including the media framing of political 
conflicts. Since press freedom is a part of the very definition of democracy, the more 
democratic the regime is, the greater space exists for competing frames in the media 
coverage of democratisation conflicts. It is important to clearly distinguish different 
UHJLPH W\SHV EHFDXVH H[FHVVLYHO\ YDJXH WHUPV VXFK DV µUHJLPH LQ GHPRFUDWLF
WUDQVLWLRQ¶ DUH KLJKO\ SRSXODU LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH EXW Pay be misleading for some 
purposes. This term may include various regime types (or regime situations): regimes 
just after authoritarian breakdown (literally in transition from one political regime to 
another), hybrid regimes ± which mix democratic institutions and authoritarian rule on 
a more permanent basis ± and new democracies, or regimes that are above the 
SURFHGXUDO WKUHVKROGRI GHPRFUDF\*RLQJEDFN WR0H&R'(0¶VFRQIOLFW FDVHVRQH
should expect more competing perspectives in the media coverage of 
democratisation conflicts in South Africa and Serbia ± as more advanced in 
democratic development ± than in Kenya and Egypt. 
Within this rather broad conceptual terrain and a few insights from the 
literature on media and conflict are worth exploring. First, tKHµLQGH[LQJ¶WKHVLVZKLFK
was developed in the study of media and foreign policy in western democracies, if 
DSSOLHG WR 0H&R'(0¶V UHVHDUFK DJHQGD FRXOG DSSHDU LQ WKH IROORZLQJ IRUP WKH
political elite consensus on the issue at the centre of a particular democratisation 
conflict is reflected in media reporting, even if trustworthy but conflicting evidence 
exists from unofficial circles; conversely, the lack of elite consensus is reflected in 
competing perspectives on the issues in media coverage, largely in proportion with 
SROLWLFDODFWRUV¶SHUFHLYHGSRZHU/LNHZLVHZKHQWKHUH LVQRSROLF\RQWKHSDUWLFXODU
issue, the media tend to present different perspectives on it. For example, when it 
comes to democratisation conflicts in Serbia, one should expect more pluralistic 
media coverage of the 2001 transitional justice and the 2008 election conflicts, which 
involved severe elite conflicts, than in the 2010 Pride parade conflict in which right-
wing groups tried to challenge an emerging elite consensus. 
Second, the study of media coverage of various political conflicts in western 
democracies suggests that highly institutionalised conflicts, such as election 
campaigns and to a lesser extent legislative debates, provide more space for 
competing frames in the media than other conflicts. Robust political competition is 
most highly institutionalised in election campaigns, which is reflected in specific 
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norms that govern press behaviour. The media thus routinely present competing 
perspectives in election coverage, which is not the case when it comes to other parts 
of the political process. (The assumption is that elections are competitive, free and 
fair.) One could therefore hypothesise that the media framing of elections will be 
more pluralistic than that of other forms of conflict in new democracies. Such effects 
PD\EHHYHQDPSOLILHG LQ WKLVSROLWLFDO FRQWH[W8QOLNH µROG¶ GHPRFUDFLHVPRVWQHZ
democracies lack horizontal accountability ± or checks that the legislature, the 
judiciary and independent regulatory agencies exert upon the executive ± which may 
increase the significance of election campaigns and secure their more pluralistic 
coverage. 
Third, a literature on the media coverage of election campaigns in western 
GHPRFUDFLHV FODLPV WKDW µJDPH¶ IUDPHV SUHYDLO $QG PRUH EURDGO\ WKDW µVWUDWHJ\¶
frames are abundant in the media coverage of politics in general. (One could 
SHUKDSV HYHQ GUDZ SDUDOOHO ZLWK ZDU MRXUQDOLVP¶V IRFXV RQ PLOLWDU\ VWUDWHJ\ DV
opposed to that on the causes of war.) It would be interesting to explore how 
widespread strategic framing (as opposed to issue-based coverage) of conflicts in 
transitions from authoritarian rule and in new democracies is. Is it limited to the 
coverage of election campaigns or does it spread out to other conflict types? Or 
perhaps its significance depends on other factors, such as the historical and cultural 
legacy of a particular country? What are consequences of widespread strategic 
framing (if any) for the quality of democracy in these contexts? 
Fourth, it remains unclear how media frame conflicts in various stages of 
democratisation, that is, whether more pluralistic and confrontational framing of 
conflicts is to be expected in transitions from authoritarian rule or later, once the basic 
democratic institutions have already been put into place. The four countries selected 
for empirical research in MeCoDEM provide a solid testing ground to explore the two 
hypotheses or, alternatively, the claim that the role media play in democratisation 
principally depends on other factors, such as the mode of transition and prior regime 
type. The reason is that these countries found themselves ± during selected 
democratisation conflicts ± in a wide range of democratisation stages, had different 
old regime legacies and had gone through different modes of transition. 
Fifth, a review of the literature suggests that contemporary media coverage of 
popular protests and social movements in western democracies is not very different 
from that of political parties. The focus is not only on the spectacle aspect of popular 
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protests, but also on goals and policy proposals, in sharp contrast to the coverage of 
social movements before the 1970s (and of contemporary non-democratic regimes), 
which used to concentrate on violence. Does the same argument apply in new 
democracies in which popular protest has not yet become institutionalised? South 
$IULFD¶VVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\SURWHVWVDUHDQLQWHUHVWLQJWHVWLQJJURXQGIRUWKLVDUJXPHQW
$OVRKRZWKHPHGLDFRYHUDJHRIVXFKµOHJLWLPDWH¶SURWHVWVGLIIHUVIURPthat of largely 
µLOOHJLWLPDWH¶ SROLWLFDO DFWLRQ ± e.g., xenophobic attacks in the same country and of 
similar protests in other countries, such as right-ZLQJYLROHQFHVXUURXQGLQJ6HUELD¶V
Pride parade or Muslim-Christian violence in Egypt? Finally, is media framing of 
µLOOHJLWLPDWH¶ SRSXODU SURWHVWV GLIIHUHQW DQG LI VR KRZ IURP WKDW LQ ZHVWHUQ
democracies? 
Sixth, the literature on media and conflict in divided societies suggests that the 
H[FOXVLYLVW PHGLD FRYHUDJH RI µULYDO¶ HWKQLF OLQJXLVWLF UDFLDO Ldeological or sexual 
PLQRULWLHV PD\ XQGHUPLQH GHPRFUDF\ DQG IDFLOLWDWH YLROHQFH µ2WKHULQJ¶ RI PLQRULW\
groups by drawing on various constructions of the opposing group identities, often 
based on victimisation polarises the society while the media can also aid recruitment 
and co-ordination of the perpetrators of violence, strengthen their resolve and help 
them gain power. A hypothesis may be formulated in this way: the more exclusivist 
WKHPHGLDFRYHUDJHRIµULYDO¶HWKQLFOLQJXLVWLFUDFLDOLGHRORJLFDORU other groups, the 
more likely that it will undermine democratic institutions and facilitate violence. Which 
factors facilitate such exclusivist coverage of minority groups? Specific conflict types, 
the depth of social divisions, political polarisation or the stage of democratisation? 
.HQ\D¶V  DQG  HOHFWLRQ FDPSDLJQV SURYLGH FRQWUDVWLQJ FDVHV WKDW VKRXOG
shed light on these issues. 
To sum up, this literature review of the media coverage of various forms of 
political conflict shows that, despite the highly fragmented nature of the field, existing 
research provides some conceptual and theoretical tools for the empirical study of 
the media framing of democratisation conflicts. In this section, I discussed some of 
the most obvious hypotheses in the literature, those that are directly relevant from the 
SHUVSHFWLYH RI 0H&R'(0¶V UHVHDUFK SURJUDPPH DQG HVSHFLDOO\ RI WKH PHGLD
framing of democratisation conflicts in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. It 
appears that (at least some of) the proposed variables and mechanisms work in 
SDUDOOHO RQ GLIIHUHQW OHYHOV FRPSRXQG RU FDQFHO RXW HDFK RWKHUV¶ HIIHFWV DQGRU
combine in different ways in various political contexts, thus forming distinctive 
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trajectories. A detailed analysis of quantitative and qualitative empirical data from 
democratisation conflicts in selected countries should provide at least some 
additional insights on the role media play in democratisation. 
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